Exploiting Defenses against GAN-Based Feature Inference Attacks in
  Federated Learning by Luo, Xinjian & Zhu, Xiangqi
Exploiting Defenses against GAN-Based Feature Inference
Attacks in Federated Learning
Xinjian Luo and Xiangqi Zhu
National University of Singapore
xinjian.luo@u.nus.edu
ABSTRACT
With the rapid increasing of computing power and dataset vol-
ume, machine learning algorithms have been widely adopted in
classification and regression tasks. Though demonstrating supe-
rior performance than traditional algorithms, machine learning
algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, such as model
inversion and membership inference. To protect user privacy, feder-
ated learning is proposed for decentralized model training. Recent
studies, however, show that Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
based attacks could be applied in federated learning to effectively
reconstruct user-level privacy data.
In this paper, we exploit defenses against GAN-based attacks
in federated learning. Given that GAN could effectively learn the
distribution of training data, GAN-based attacks aim to reconstruct
human-distinguishable images from victim’s personal dataset. To
defense such attacks, we propose a framework, Anti-GAN, to pre-
vent attackers from learning the real distribution of victim’s data.
More specifically, victims first project personal training data onto
a GAN’s generator, then feed the generated fake images into the
global shared model for federated learning. In addition, we design
a new loss function to encourage victim’s GAN to generate images
which not only have similar classification features with original
training data, but also have indistinguishable visual features to
prevent inference attack.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software and application security;
Privacy-preserving protocols; Distributed systems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Machine Learning (ML), especially deep learning, has
received increasing attention in both academia and industry. With
its superior performance over traditional algorithms, ML is playing
a critical role in real-life applications, ranging from face recognition
to robotics. Companies like Google, Facebook and Amazon have
commercialized machine learning frameworks based on their large
scale user data. Google and Amazon have further provide “machine
learning as a service (MLaaS)”, i.e., users upload private datasets to
MLaaS platforms and obtain well-trained models [16, 19].
Despite their popularity and impressive performance, ML algo-
rithms are vulnerable to various attacks, such asmodel inversion [6],
membership inference [16, 19], model extraction [21], backdoor [4],
adversarial examples [11, 20, 24]. In addition, given that consid-
erable data is produced from edge devices, including mobiles and
wearable devices, traditional model training requires first collecting
user data in a single server and then training models on it [12].
Such centralized training methods could increase the probability
of compromising on user privacy and data security (Fig. 1). With
the rising awareness of user privacy, security related issues have
become a great concern in both public media and government [23].
To protect user privacy and data security, as well as alleviate
the problem of data fragmentation and isolation, Google first pro-
posed federated learning (FL), a distributed machine learning frame-
work [13]. The framework of federated learning is a server-client
architecture, which consists of one server and K clients. The train-
ing process of FL iteratively proceeds in multiple rounds of com-
munication to collaboratively train a shared model (Fig. 2).
Recent studies, however, show that feature inference [2, 9, 14, 22]
and backdoor attack [4] could be effectively applied to federated
learning, causing unintended information leakage and model poi-
soning. While adversarial attacks to federated learning have been
widely studied, the corresponding defences are seldom exploited.
This paper aims to exploit defences against GAN-based feature
inference attacks.
GAN is first proposed by Goodfellow et al. [7] to learn the distri-
bution of datasets feeded to a classifier. Given its impressive perfor-
mance on data reconstruction, GAN has been thoroughly studied
in multimedia related fields, such as image reconstruction [15] and
image to image translation [10]. And some recent studies employ
GAN to generate user privacy datasets in federated learning. Hitaj
et al. [9] proposed a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) based
attack to federated learning, where an adversarial client locally
trains a GAN model to deliberately reconstruct victim’s training
data, which could be a private face picture. Wang et al. [22] further
exploited user-level privacy leakage by training a multi-task GAN
model in the central server which is assumed to be malicious.
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Figure 1: Centralized learning.
Client 4Client 2Client 1 Client 3
training training training training
Figure 2: Federated learning.
There are two main challenges to design defences against GAN
based attack in federated learning: first is that cryptographic meth-
ods like homomorphic encryption are costly for edge devices and
could harm the convergence of shared model; second is that trun-
cating shared parameters could not help given that GAN could
effectively learn the training data distribution. That is, as long as
the accuracy of victim’s model is high, GAN based attack is effective
enough [9]. For simplicity, we focus on deep neural networks in
this paper.
Typically, GAN based attacks aim to reconstruct an image, xˆ
which is indistinguishable to the original image x in victim’s dataset.
In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism, Anti-GAN, to
prevent GAN based inference attacks in federated learning. The
framework of Anti-GAN is shown in Fig. 3.
The key point of Anti-GAN is to manipulate victim’s training
datasets before feeding them to the shared model, such that the
attacker’s GAN model will only learn the distribution of the dataset
after manipulation. Now the key problem becomes how to manipu-
late victim’s training datasets to prevent attackers from learning
the original data distribution as well as causing little harm to the
accuracy of shared model. As mentioned before, we can not employ
cryptographic methods as they are costly and could bring barriers
to anomaly detection in server. Adding noise to shared parameters,
such as differential privacy, will provide little help since GAN will
circumvent such mechanisms by learning original data distribution.
We propose a novel defense mechanism in which victims lever-
age GAN to obfuscate original datasets to alleviate the GAN based
reconstruction attacks from adversarial clients.
More specifically, first the victim trains a GANmodel to generate
samples X ′ from the original dataset X , such that X ′ and X have
the same or similar feature maps while X ′ is indistinguishable to
X by human; then X ′ is feeded to the shared model, causing little
harm to the accuracy of global shared model while decreasing the
plausibility of reconstructed images generated by attacker’s GAN.
As mentioned before, GAN could efficiently learn data distribu-
tions from original datasets, such that the samples X ′ generated by
victim’s GAN is enough representative ofX , bringing little degrada-
tion to the performance of shared model. Meanwhile, we introduce
an unsupervised learning task to victim’s GAN to encourage ob-
fuscating X ′ such that the generated data Xˆ by attacker’s GAN is
indistinguishable to human. Our contributions are summarized as
follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we first explore the defences
against GAN-based feature inference attacks in federated
learning. The proposed defense framework, Anti-GAN, could
effectively prevent attackers from extracting distinguishable
visual features from original datasets.
• Correspondingly, we explore unsupervised learning patterns
and innovative loss functions to our defense GAN model, to
maximally preserve the classification features for the gen-
erated samples while generally obfuscating their visual fea-
tures.
• We conduct extensive experiments onMNIST, Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR-10 to show the effectiveness of Anti-GAN.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives
related work and background information. Our proposed defense
framework is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 will give experi-
mental results to demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of
proposed scheme. Finally, we summarize our work and give some
future directions in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK AND BACKGROUND
In this paper, we propose a mechanism, called Anti-GAN, to
defense against GAN based attacks in federated learning. Before
detailing Anti-GAN, we first explain related work and background
information, including federated learning, generative adversarial
network and mainstream attacks to machine learning.
2.1 Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is first proposed by Google to solve
the problem of data isolation and protect user privacy [13]. The
motivation of this concept is closely related to the rising of edge
devices, egg. mobiles, sensors, wearable devices, autonomous cars.
Amachine learning algorithm is a functionmapping fθ : X 7→ Y
with respect to a set of parameters θ , where X is the input andY is
2
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Figure 3: The framework of Anti-GAN.
the output. For image classification task, X denotes a collection of
images, andY denotes a set of labels corresponding to these images.
Federated learning enables multiple data holders to collaboratively
train a shared global model. The training process of FL proceeds
in multiple rounds of communications as shown in Fig. 2: first, the
server randomly selects a fraction of clients and sends the global
model state to each client; then each selected client trains the model
on their local data and exchange model parameters to each other
via the server. Suppose N data holders {F1, · · · ,FN } wish to train
a shared modelMF ED with their respective data {D1, · · · ,DN }.
The objective of federated learning is:
min
θ ∈Rd
L(θ ) where L(θ ) =
N∑
k=1
nk
n
ℓk (θ ), (1)
where nk = |Dk |, and n =
∑k=1
N nk is the total number of training
points, and ℓk (θ ) = 1nk
∑
i ∈Dk ℓ(xi ,yi ;θ ) is the loss of Fk ’s local
model. ℓ(xi ,yi ;θ ) denotes the loss of prediction on sample point
(xi ,yi ) with parameters θ .
Conventional method would first put all the data together, i.e.
D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ DN , then train a model MSUM . Typically, the
accuracyVF ED of modelMF ED should be close to the accuracy
VSUM of centralized modelMSUM . Formally, we have δ -accuracy
loss FL algorithm if
|VF ED −VSUM | < δ , (2)
where δ is a non-negative real number.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) is firstly proposed by
Goodfellow et al. [7], then improved by Radford and Metz as Deep
Convolutional Generative Adversarial Networks (DCGANs) [15],
which is also the basis of most image-related studies.
Typically, GAN is a minimax two-player game, which consists
of a generator G and a discriminator D. The objective of G is to
generate psuedo-samples G(z) from random noise z such that G(z)
is indistinguishable from the training sample x feeded to D. The
training process of GAN is like a facial composite imaging for police,
where an artist (G) generates a picture based on an eyewitness (D)
description of suspect’s face [9]. Typically, D andG play a minimax
game [7] such that
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata (x )[logD(x)]+Ez∼pz (z)[log(1−D(G(z)))],
(3)
where pdata denotes the original data distribution feeded to dis-
criminatorD, and pz denotes the prior distribution of noise variable
z.D(x) is the probability output byD that x comes from the original
training data rather than the generater.
However, the original version of GAN is hard to train in prac-
tice [8, 15]. Arjovsky et al. [3] proposedWasserstein GAN (WGAN)
which use Wasserstein distance in the loss function:
min
G
max
D
VW (D,G) = Ex∼pdata (x )[D(x)]−Ez∼pz (z)[D(G(z))]. (4)
In this paper, we use WGAN as defender’s (or victim’s) GAN
model, and follow the approach in [8] to train our model.
2.3 Attacks and Defences in Machine Learning
Despite being increasingly important, machine learning algo-
rithms are vulnerable to various attacks, such as membership infer-
ence [16, 19], model inversion [6] and model extraction [21].
Membership Inference typically determine whether a point is in
the training dataset or not. Shokri et al. [19] propose a shadow train-
ing technique: first train k shadow models to mimic the behavior of
target model, then accordingly train an attack (membership infer-
ence) model. Salem et al. [16] greatly broaden the application of [19]
by gradually relaxing its limitations: first adversary only needs to
train one shadow model; second adversary uses a totally different
training set and one shadowmodel; then third adversary could infer
the membership only based on empirical statistics. Model Inversion
attacks try to use black-box access to estimate the feature values
from training dataset. Fredrikson et al. [6] explored model inver-
sion attacks in two settings: decision trees and neural networks.
The example given in [6] shows that Fredrikson et al.’s attack could
roughly reconstruct a face picture of a victim given only a name and
black-box access to target model. Model Extraction attacks try to
duplicate the parameters of target model. Tramèr et al. [21] propose
effective attack methods to logistic regression, neural networks and
decision trees. In this paper, we call attacks aiming to reconstruct
3
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images from victim’s personal dataset as Feature Inference, which
is also a type of model inversion.
Several defenses against these attacks have been proposed to al-
leviate the risk of data leakage, for example, anomaly detection [4],
dropout [14, 16], differential privacy [4, 18], secure multiparty com-
putation (MPC) [5] and model stacking [16].
In federated learning, some newest studies exploit feature infer-
ence attacks based on GANs. Hitaj et al. [9] propose a GAN based
threat model, in which an adversary tries to extract the training
information of a class that is not owned by her. A newest study [22]
suppose the server is malicious and utilize GAN to explore user-
level privacy leakage, which is basically the same idea as Hitaj et
al.’s work. However, few effective methods have been proposed to
defence such attacks. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper
to exploit defenses against GAN-based feature inference attacks.
3 APPROACH
Our defense mechanism is mainly designed against GAN based
feature inference attacks in federated learning. In this section, we
will first introduce the threat model and exemplify GAN based
attacks with the method in [9], then details the framework of Anti-
GAN.
3.1 Threat Model
There are generally two types of GAN based threat models in fed-
erated learning: one or some participants are adversaries, egg. [9],
or the central server is adversary, egg. [22]. Nonetheless, the basic
ideas under these threats are similar. That is, take the global shared
model as a discriminator, then train a GAN model to reconstruct
the victim’s private training data. For simplicity, we focus on the
attack model in [9].
In federated learning, all participants agree on a common global
model and the data labels held by each participant before training.
Suppose the central server is authoritative and can not be com-
promised be any adversaries. One participant, acting as adversary,
intends to extract the training data owned by other participants. For
simplicity, suppose adversary A owns data with labels [b, c], and
victim V declares labels [a,b]. The objective of A is to reconstruct
the data with label a owned by V .
The attack process is as follows: first, V honestly trains a local
model and uploads the model parameters to central server; second,
A downloads these parameters and accordingly updates the discrim-
inator of his GAN model. Then A generates a data point of label a
from GAN and labels it as class c . A will train his local model with
these pseudo-samples and share the parameters to global model to
encourage V providing more information about a class. In the end,
A could reconstruct an image of class a which is indistinguishable
fromV ’s original images. The authors of [9] claim that it is difficult
to design defenses against such attacks as long as the accuracy of
victim’s local model is high enough.
3.2 The framework of Anti-GAN
The challenge of designing defences against such attacks lies in
how to prevent adversary learning the original data distribution,
meanwhile causing no or little harm to the accuracy of global model.
In Anti-GAN, a WGAN model is used to distort the distribution
of victim’s dataset X . More specifically, before feeding X into the
global shared model, the victim (or defender) first uses a WGAN to
learn the data distribution of X and generates a shadow sample set
X ′, then inputX ′ to the global model. In addition, motivated by [17],
we design a new loss function for the generator G of defender’s
WGAN to guarantee that the classification feature maps of X ′ are
similar to that of X . We further introduce an unsupervised task for
WGAN to increase the indistinguishability of G(z) to human, such
that the samples generated by attack’s GAN could demonstrate
little plausible visual features.
3.2.1 Preserving Classification Features. It has been shown that
the minimax loss of WGAN in Eq. 4 achieves an optimum when
{x | pд(x) , pdata (x)} has zero Lebesgue-measure [3], where
pд denotes the distribution of generator and pdata denotes the
distribution of original dataset. In addition, it was also shown that
pд will converge to pdata if G and D have enough capacity [17].
That is,
Ex∼pdata
[
min
z
| |Gt (z) − x | |2
]
→ 0, (5)
where Gt is the generator of WGAN after t training steps.
Therefore, if G and D have enough capacity for representing
data, the reconstructed samples X ′ fromWGAN would not degrade
the performance of the global classification model, compared to the
original dataset X .
To encourage a similar feature map between X ′ and X , we intro-
duce an objective function for G:
min
z
Lsim where Lsim = | |G(z) − x | |22 . (6)
As Eq. 6 is a non-convex optimization problem, we follow [17] to
generate a near optimum result G(z∗) by using R random initial-
izations of z to conduct a fixed number of gradient descendent
steps.
3.2.2 Obfuscating Visual Features. Given that victim feeds the gen-
erated samples X ′ to the global shared model, the adversary could
reconstruct a plausible sample xˆ using his own GAN model by
learning the distribution of X ′, egg., generating a plausible image
to human. To reduce the risk of privacy leakage, we need to obfus-
cate the visual features ofX ′ such that the xˆ generated by adversary
is indistinguishable to human eyes.
Inspired by the experimental part of [10], we find GAN tends to
produce sharp images. To further distort the visual features of X ′,
we introduce another objective function for defender’s G:
max
z
Lobf where Lobf = logVar (G(z)), (7)
where Var (G(z)) denotes the variance of G(z)). Similar to Eq. 6,
Eq. 7 is also a non-convex problem. We follow the training steps for
Eq. 6 to find an optimum solution to Eq. 7. While average, grayish
images are also less distinguishable to human. We could rewrite
Eq. 7 as:
min
z
Lobf where Lobf = logVar (G(z)). (8)
But minimizing the pixel variance of generated images could bal-
ance out the outcomes learned by generator, leading to scarcely
preservation of classification features. We will give more discus-
sions in subsection 4.3.
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Figure 4: RIAFI values under different λs, tested on MNIST dataset.
(a) λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0 (b) λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0 (c) λ1 = 0, λ2 = 40
Figure 5: The effects of λ1 and λ2 on generated images.
To summarize, our final objective is
G∗(z∗) = arдmin
G
max
D
VW (D,G) +min
G,z
[
λ1Lsim − λ2Lobf
]
, (9)
where λ1 and λ2 are hyper parameters respectively controlling the
effect of classification features perservation and visual features
obfuscating.
3.2.3 Training Process. In training process, the defender first trains
an WGAN model based on personal dataset X , then generates fake
images X ′ by this model, and feeds these images into the global
classification model for training. Considering X ′ might deviate
from X on classification features, the defender could mix a certain
proportion of real images with fake images as the input, to further
improve the classification accuracy of global model on real images.
More details will be discussed in subsection 4.2.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiments, we use three image datasets: MNIST digits
dataset, Fashion-MNIST clothing dataset and CIFAR-10 colored
object dataset. The targeted images, held exclusively by the de-
fender, are labeled as 6 in these three datasets. WGAN is used as
the network architecture for GANs of both attacker and defender.
In the setting of [9], attacker is a normal participant who could
use the global classification model as the discriminator of her GAN.
But the images generated by such GAN model are useless in most
cases, i.e., generated images are not the images with targeted labels.
Further, the malicious impact performed by the attacker could
gradually disappear with the developing of training process of
federated learning. Therefore, we assume a more powerful attacker
in our experiments, who has black-box access to victim’s dataset.
Though unable to directly get the targeted images, this attacker can
feed these images into the discriminator of a GAN and accordingly
learn the distribution of the targeted images. Such setting proposes
greater challenges to our defense mechanism. We will show the
experimental results in the following subsections.
4.1 Impact of λ1 and λ2
In Eq. 9, λ1 and λ2 respectively determine the extents of classifi-
cation feature preservation and visual feature obfuscation. In this
section, we show the impacts of λ1 and λ2 on classification features
and visual features.
To determine whether the classification features of original
datasetX is well preserved in the generated datasetX ′, we first feed
X ′ into the global classification model for training, then test the
model accuracy on X , which is called Real-Image Accuracy from
Fake Images (RIAFI). We respectively test the RIAFIs of λ1 and
5
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY Xinjian Luo and Xiangqi Zhu
 
 
 
           
epoch1 epoch10 epoch20 epoch30 epoch40 epoch50 epoch60 epoch70 epoch80 epoch90 epoch100 
 
 
           
epoch1 epoch10 epoch20 epoch30 epoch40 epoch50 epoch60 epoch70 epoch80 epoch90 epoch100 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0% 1% 5% 10% 20% 50% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Generated images by attacker under different MRs (λ1 = 0.005, λ2 = 48).
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Figure 7: RIAFIs under different mix ratio of
real images and generated fake images.
λ2 by alternatively fixing one and changing the other. The results,
tested on MNIST dataset, are shown in Fig. 4.
λ1 controls the effect ofminz Lsim = | |G(z) −x | |22 . In this exper-
iment, defender’s personal image set are the images labeled as 6 in
MNIST, hence we replace x withMean(x), which will help produce
images with pixel values similar to the pixel-wise mean of real
images, as shown in Fig. 5b. Such method is vulnerable to object
translations. Replacing x withMean(MaxPool(x)), resulting in in-
variance to translation [1], could be more promising for preserving
classification features, we put it in our future work.
λ2 controls the effect of maxz Lobf , i.e., maximizing pixel vari-
ance of generated images. In Fig. 4b, we can see that generally,
larger value of λ2 will lead to lower classification accuracies on
real images, causing greater deviations of generated images from
real images. One interesting observation in Fig. 4b is that the RIAFI
value is 0 when λ2 = 0, while λ2 = 10 brings a RIAFI greater than
90%. The reason could be that the generator of GAN tends to gen-
erate sharp images, and a small value of λ2 could increase the pixel
variance of generated images, helping the generater better learn
the edges of objects in real images (as shown in Fig. 5c).
4.2 Impact of Mixing real images with fake
images
As mentioned in subsection 3.2.3, the classification feature of
fake images generated by defender might slightly deviate from real
images. Defender could choose to mix a certain portion of real
images with fake images to improve the accuracy of global model.
We define the mix ratio (MR) as:
MR =
#real images
#generated fake images (10)
Fig. 7 shows RIAFIs based on training sets with different mix ra-
tio of real images and fake images. We can see that RIAFI generally
improves with the increasing of real image proportion. Another ob-
servation is that the RIAFI of Fashion-MNIST has a slower growth
than MNIST, which could be caused by the relatively more com-
plicated patterns in each class of Fashion-MNIST. Generally, class
with more complicated patterns is harder to be classified than the
class with simpler patterns. Therefore, more real images of Fashion-
MNIST are needed to improve the generalization of classifier than
MNIST.
Fig. 6 shows the generated images by attacker’s GAN model
under different MRs. We can see that if defender mixes more real
images into the training set, attacker could accordingly generate
distinguishable images with greater probability.
4.3 Comparison between maxLobf and
minLobf
To obfuscate the visual features of real images, the defender could
choose to generate sharp images (maxLobf ) or grayish images
(minLobf ). In this section, we will compare the effects between
maxLobf and minLobf . Considering Lobf = logVar (G(z)), we
will use Lobf and Var (G(z)) alternately in the following part.
Fig. 8 shows the fake images generated by defender based on dif-
ferent loss functions, where Fig. 8a shows the images generated by
traditionalWGAN.We can see thatmaxVar (G(z)) greatly improves
the sharpness of generated images, even vigorously increasing the
pixel values in a certain channel of multi-channel images (Fig. 8b).
In contrast, minVar (G(z)) could decrease the pixel values in all
channels, producing more grayish images (Fig. 8c).
We give an intuitive explanation for the effects ofmaxVar (G(z))
and minVar (G(z)) in Fig. 9, which shows the data distributions
learned by GAN under different loss functions. Traditional GAN
tries to learn the original data distribution (Fig. 9a), while defend-
ers’ GAN tries to learn and fairly distort the original distribution.
maxVar (G(z)) will produce fake images where high pixel values
are further increased and low pixels are decreased (Fig. 9b), while
minVar (G(z)) tends to decrease all the pixel values of generated
images compared to real images (Fig. 9c). Fig. 9 indicates that
maxVar (G(z)) could better preserve the classification features of
real images thanminVar (G(z)), which is consistent with the RIAFI
comparisons shown in Fig. 10.
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(a) Originated fake images with λ2 = 0 (b) maxVar (G(z)) with λ2 = 40 (c) minVar (G(z)) with λ2 = 0.5
Figure 8: Comparison of generated frog images (CIFAR10) between maxVar (G(z)) and minVar (G(z)), with λ1 = 0.
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Figure 9: Data distributions of generated images after maxVar (G(z)) and minVar (G(z)).
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Figure 10: Comparison of RIAFIs between
maxVar (G(z)) and minVar (G(z)) (MNIST).
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show the images generated during training
process based on maxVar (G(z)) and minVar (G(z)) respectively.
Accordingly, Fig. 13 shows the loss curves of maxVar (G(z)) and
minVar (G(z)). We can see that minVar (G(z)) is hard to converge.
One possible reason is that minVar (G(z)) could balance out gener-
ator’s efforts of learning data distributions.
5 CONCLUSION
Federated learning is vulnerable to GAN base feature inference
attacks, which aim to generate distinguishable images from victim’s
personal training dataset. Such attacks are hard to defence as long
as victim’s local classifier has good performance. In this paper,
We propose a framework, called Anti-GAN, to defence such GAN
based attacks. Anti-GAN could distort the original distribution
of training data to prevent attackers generating distinguishable
images, meanwhile causing little harm to the testing accuracy of
global classifier. In addition, not limited to federated learning, Anti-
GAN is also promising to defence dataset reconstruction attacks
on traditional machine learning algorithms.
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Figure 11: The learning process of Anti-GAN with maxVar (G) and λ2 = 48, on Fashion-MNIST.
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 Figure 12: The learning process of Anti-GAN with minVar (G) and λ2 = 3.53, on Fashion-MNIST.
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